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NOTES
Copyright: Same Song, Different Verse: Parody as Fair
Use After Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.*
Satire is the sort of glass, wherein beholders do generally discover
everybody's face but their own.
- Jonathan Swift'
L Introduction
Suppose that an artist sees another person's copyrighted work as rich in potential
for some pointed social criticism or a wry humorous twist. Suppose further that the
artist creates a satirical or parodic variation of that work. Can the artist now show
his work to others or market and sell this parody2 of the original? Does it matter
what the artist's motivations were - whether they were a social critique or a
comical twist? Should we consider whether the criticism is aimed at the original
work or at some other target? Most importantly, does parody deserve an exclusion
from copyright infringement?
Artists sometimes use parody to generate a raised social awareness and sometimes
merely to amuse.' Some artists have made an entire career of creating parodies of
other artists' work.4 The depth of the parody may vary widely. Sometimes the
parodist will direct his or her derision at the original work itself. On other
occasions, a pointed social commentary on an entirely different subject is swathed
in a seemingly mirthful ridicule of the original work. A work that directs its
commentary or criticism at someone or something other than the original work is
called a satire.'
* This note won the first place prize in the 1995 ASCAP Nathan Burken Memorial Competi-
tion.
1. Preface, in JONATHAN SwIFr, THE BATTLE OF THE BooKs 397 (Miriam K. Starkman ed., 1962)
(1704).
2. Parody is defined as a literary or artistic work that imitates the characteristic style of an author
or a work for comic effect or ridicule. AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 954 (stand. ed. 1993).
3. See generally DWIGHT MACDONALD, PARODIES: AN ANTHOLOGY FROM CHAUCER TO BEERBOHM
- AND AFTER (1960).
4. Artists who work primarily in the genre of parody will usually obtain the copyright owners
permission before creating the parody. Fair use under section 107 of the Copyright Act of 1976 is not
implicated where the artist obtains the copyright owners permission. See, e.g., WEIRD AL YANKOVIC,
IN 3D (Scotti Bros. Records 1984) (record album containing exclusively musical parodies).
5. Satire is defined as the use of derisive wit in any context to attack folly or wickedness.
AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 1154 (stand. ed. 1993).
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When the work focuses its commentary or criticism primarily on the original
subject matter itself as a parody, the artist may borrow liberally from the original
work and compose something trenchant and goading. On the other hand, the artist
might merely hint at the original, creating something lilting and humorous.
Whatever the parodist's style or depth of borrowing, he or she must imitate, to some
degree, a known work to achieve the desired effect. This borrowing is the very
nature of parody. This nature, however, puts the interests of the copyright owner
squarely in conflict with those of the parodist.6
This note examines how the law deals with the various interests involved in
music parody cases and how the Supreme Court chose to delimit the rights of the
parodist relative to those of the original artist. First, this note discusses the
Copyright Act of 1976 and the fair use doctrine. Next, this note examines the
application of section 107 of the Act as an exception to copyright. Further, this note
evaluates how the defendant used the fair use doctrine as an exception to copyright
in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.7 Finally, this note considers the application
of the fair use doctrine to satire and addresses the concerns that a lenient application
of the doctrine could lead to abuses of this exception to copyright.
II. The Fair Use Exception
A. The Copyright Act of 1976
In the United States, authors' of all types of works - writings, paintings,
musical recordings, movies - enjoy protection from unauthorized use of their work
by others. This protection stems from early English common law.' The First
Continental Congress recognized a critical need to protect authors' works."0 The
Congress adopted a form of copyright protection based on English law to serve this
need." Copyright underwent several dramatic changes from its beginnings in
6. Plaintiffs have litigated the parody issue in other areas of intellectual property, especially
trademark law. In Jordache Enters., Inc. v. Hogg Wyld, Ltd., 828 F.2d 1482 (10th Cir. 1987), the owner
of a trademark for women's designer jeans sued claiming that the defendant's use of the mark "Lardashe"
for its size extra-large jeims infringed their mark "Jordache." The court held that defendant's use of the
mark would not cause a likelihood of confusion about the source. Another court, in a rather surprising
opinion, found that a defendant infringed with their mark "Enjoy Cocaine" which was similar in color
and style to the Coca-Ccla Company's mark, "Enjoy Coca-Cola." The court stated that "some persons
of apparently average intelligence did attribute sponsorship to plaintiff and discontinued their use of
Coca-Cola as an expression of resentment." See Coca-Cola Co. v. Gemini Rising, Inc., 346 F. Supp.
1183, 1189 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
7. 114 S. Ct. 1164 (1994).
8. This note will use the terms "author" and "artist" synonymously, except where otherwise
specified, as the person or persons whose creative efforts resulted in the copyrightable material.
9. See PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT, PATENT, TRADEMARK AND RELATED STATE DOCTRINES 537
(3d ed. 1993).
10. Id.
11. The American Colonies adopted a copyright system similar to the one practiced under the first
English copyright act, the Statute of Anne, 1709, 8 Anne, ch. 19 (Eng.). This statute provided printers
with protection for their work for 14 years as well as remedies for infringement. See generally BRUCE
W. BUGBEE, GENESIS OF AMERICAN PATENT AND COPYRIGHT LAW (1967); BENJAMIN KAPLAN, AN
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colonial America and eventually evolved into its present form. 2 One of the first
major changes was the statutory codification of the rights and neccessities of
copyright in the Copyright Act of 1909."3 The Copyright Act of 1909 outlined the
requirements, extent, and duration of copyright. 4 The current law of copyright is
controlled by the Copyright Act of 1976's (the Act). The 1976 version of the Act
modified slightly the 1909 version. 6 These modifications of the 1909 version
included the changes in the length of copyright protection. 7 The 1976 version of
the act also removed the requirement that a work be published before receiving
protection. 8 Under the 1976 version of the Act, works need only be fixed in a
tangible medium."
A work must meet the requirements listed under section 102 of the Act to enjoy
the protection of copyright.' One requirement for protection is that a work be
more than a mere idea. The work must involve some creative effort on the part of
the author to be copyrightable.2' Protection will only begin when the idea is fixed
in a tangible medium.' Once an artist meets these requirements, he or she receives
a limited monopoly on his or her work for the life of the author plus fifty years.'
The Act assures artists the exclusive right to reproduce their works, prepare
derivativeu works, distribute copies, perform the works, and display the works
UNHURRIED VIEW OF COPYRIGHT 4 (1967).
12. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 9, at 537-38.
13. Id. at 598.
14. Id. at 537-38.
15. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 101-810, 1001-1010 (West 1977 & Supp. 1995).
16. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 9, at 551-54.
17. Under the 1909 act, protection lasted 28 years with a possible additional 28-year extension. Id.
at 551.
18. Id. at 551-54.
19. The Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C.A. § 101 (West 1977), states that a work is fixed in a
tangible medium of expression when its embodiment in a copy or phonorecord, by or under the authority
of the author, is sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise
communicated for a period of more than transitory duration. A work consisting of sounds, images, or
both, that are being transmitted, is "fixed" for purposes of this title if a fixation of the work is being
made simultaneously with its transmission. Id.
20. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C.A. § 102 (West 1977 & Supp. 1995).
21. Id. A work must contain some modicum of creativity to receive protection under copyright. A
new work that is essentially the same as an existing work, with only superficial differences, will not
enjoy copyright protection. See Feist Publications v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 111 S. Ct. 1282 (1991).
22. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C.A. § 102(a) (West 1977 & Supp. 1995); see Mazer v. Stein,
347 U.S. 201, 217 (1954).
23. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C.A. § 302(a) (West 1977 & Supp. 1995). Works created before
Jan. 1, 1978 are protected for 28 years beyond the copyright date. 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 302-304 (West 1977
& Supp. 1995).
24. A "derivative work" is a work based upon one or more preexisting works, such as a translation,
musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture version, sound recording, art
reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or another form in which a work may be recast, transformed,
or adapted. A work consisting of editorial revisions, annotations, elaborations, or other modifications
which, as a whole, represent an original work of authorship, is a "derivative work." Copyright Act of
1976, 17 U.S.C.A. § 101 (West 1977 & Supp. 1995). This note will apply the term "derivative" to both
parodies and satires when referring to works that use a portion of.an earlier copyrighted work.
1995]
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publicly.' If an infringer uses the artist's work in one of the proscribed fashions,
the Act provides the artist with redress.' Redress might include an injunction,27
impoundment," and/or damages and profits.'
B. Exceptions to Copyright Under Section 107
The Copyright Act of 1976 does not prohibit another artist from using the
original copyrighted work in every circumstance." A work is not an impermissible
infringement of a preexisting copyright if that work meets the requirements set forth
in section 107.31 Section 107 of the Act permits an artist to copy the original if the
artist's use is "fair." Congress tailored this doctrine of fair use in a manner that
preserved its elastic nature from its beginnings as a judicial construct as an
exception to copyright.32 The Act recognizes specific exceptions in the preamble;
however, it also provides a flexible guide which allows courts to extend the
exception to other works not specifically mentioned in the preamble. The preamble
contains a nonexclusive list of examples of fair use, including criticism, comment,
news reporting, tea zhing, and scholarship or research. Fair use, within the
purview of section 107, depends on consideration of four factors listed in the Act:
(1) the purpose and character of the use, (2) the nature of the copyrighted work, (3)
the amount and substantiality of the portion used, and (4) the effect of the use upon
the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.'
Currently, an artist who wishes to create a variation of another's work may look
only to section 107 for an exception to copyright?5 In the past, some defendants
have attempted to use a First Amendment argument that their personal expression,
albeit similar to a copyrighted work, is protected as free speech under the
Constitution.' The law is well settled in this area; the courts have effectively
eliminated any freedom of speech argument as a defense to copyright infringe-
25. Id. § 106(1)-(5).
26. Id. § 501(b).
27. Id. § 502.
28. Id. § 503(a).
29. Id. § 504.
30. Id. § 107.
31. Id.; see also Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 560-61 (1985); Sony
Corp. v. Universal City Studios Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 433 (1984); Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 435 (9th
Cir. 1986); Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751,756 (9th Cir. 1978); see GoLDSI'IN, supra
note 9, at 672-76.
32. See H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 65 (1976) (seeking to preserve the adaptable
nature of the fair use ddctrine because of its history of effectiveness as a judicial construct in previous
cases).
33. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C.A. § 107 (West 1977 & Supp. 1995).
34. Id.
35. See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 546; Sony, 464 U.S. at 429.
36. U.S. CONST. amcnd. I.
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ment." Therefore, in a copyright infringement case, a defendant's sole source for
an exception is section 107."
C. Application of Section 107 to Parody
Artists who create a parody must rely on section 107 as a defense to infringe-
ment. 9 Parodists may avoid infringement if a court determines that their work is a
"criticism" or a "comment."'  Criticism and comment are two of the exceptions
listed as examples of fair use in the preamble to section 107.4" However, if a work
does not clearly fit within one of these exceptions, the court must apply the four
factors listed in section 107 to determine whether the work is fair use.42
Aside from the difficulty of determining if a parody falls within one of these
categories, courts must determine how much relative weight to give to the four test
factors the Act proposes. The courts have struggled with these problems, resulting
in some ambiguity as to where parody fits in copyright law.43
Some courts' interpretations of the fair use doctrine would effectively chill
musical parody and squelch the creative efforts of the artists who choose to market
their wares.' This is because courts have adopted the premise that a parody that
has a commercial purpose is presumptively unfair based on the Supreme Court's
decision in Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.'
In Sony, the plaintiffs, who owned copyrights to television programs, sued the
manufacturer of Betamax video tape recorders. The plaintiffs maintained that the
defendant manufacturer was liable for copyright infringement allegedly committed
by consumers of the recorders who used them to tape broadcasted television
programs.
The Supreme Court stated that "every commercial use of copyrighted material is
presumptively an unfair exploitation of the monopoly privilege that belongs to the
owner of the copyright."'4 The Court found that the defendants were not liable for
37. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 9, at 679-80; see also Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d
751,758-59 (9th Cir. 1978) (concluding that defendant could have expressed their theme without copying
the plaintiffs' protected expression); Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 558-60 (recognizing that the framers of
the Constitution intended copyright itself to be the engine of free expression).
38. See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 546; Sony, 464 U.S. at 429.
39. See Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 435 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding that parody may qualify as fair
use, but that parody is not presumptively fair use).
40. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C.A. § 107 (West Supp. 1995).
41. Id.
42. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 9, at 679-80.
43. See William F. Patry & Shim Perlmutter, Fair Use Misconstrued: Profit, Presumptions, and
Parody, 11 CARDOzo ARTS & ENT. L.J. 667, 668-70 (1993); Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use
Standard, 103 HARV. L. REv. 1105, 1132 (1990).
44. See, e.g., MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, 677 F.2d 180, 183-85 (2d Cir. 1981); Elsmere Music, Inc. v.
National Broadcasting Co., 482 F. Supp. 741,747 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), aff'd per curiam, 623 F.2d 252 (2d
Cir. 1980).
45. 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
46. Id.
47. Id. at 451.
1995]
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infringement because consumers could use the recorder's video recording capability
for some other purpose than copying the protected broadcasts.4
After the Sony decision, courts began assuming that a parody that had any
commercial purpose at all was presumptively an unfair use 9 Courts, however,
applied this rule to varying degrees." Thus, the law regarding parodies remained
somewhat unsettled until the Supreme Court revisited the question in Campbell v.
Acuff-Rose Music, Inc."
III. Decisions under Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. 2
A. Facts of the Case
In July 1989, the rap group 2 Live Crew released a version of the song "Oh,
Pretty Woman." Roy Orbison and William Dees had written and recorded the
original song and assigned the rights to Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. 3 Acuff-Rose
registered a copyright in 1964. The 2 Live Crew group wrote a rap derivative of the
song and included their version on their commercially released album As Clean As
They Wanna Be.' They titled their song "Pretty Woman."5
Before 2 Live Crew released their version of the song, their manager informed
Acuff-Rose that 2 Live Crew was going to release a parody of the song and would
pay the statutorily required rate for its use. 6 Shortly after 2 Live Crew released
the song, Acuff-Rose responded, denying the license request and informing 2 Live
Crew that they would not permit the use of a parody of "Oh, Pretty Woman.""7
Almost one year later, Acuff-Rose sued 2 Live Crew, claiming that they had
infringed Acuff-Rose's copyright under the Act. Acuff-Rose also claimed that 2
Live Crew interfered with their business relations. Additionally, Acuff-Rose claimed
that 2 Live Crew interfered with prospective business advantages for the perfor-
mance and distributicn of the original song. 8
48. The plaintiffs did not bring suit against the consumers who actually recorded the copyrighted
programs. Id. at 420.
49. See generally Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985); Fisher v. Dees,
794 F.2d 432 (9th Cir. 19F6); New Line Cinema Corp. v. Bertlesman Music Group, Inc., 693 F. Supp.
1517 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
50. See Deveny A. Deck, Comment, Fine Tuning Fair Use Music Parody: A Proposal for Reform
in Acuff-Rose, Inc. v. Campbell, 71 U. DEr. MERCY L. REv. 59, 70-72 (1993) (discussing how courts
have differed in the application of the presumptively unfair rule).
51. 114 S. CL 1164 (1994).
52. Id.
53. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. v. Campbell, 754 F. Supp. 1150, 1152, rev'd, 972 F.2d 1429 (6th Cir.
1992), cert. granted, 113 S. Ct. 1642 (1993).
54. Id.
55. Titles to songs an. not copyrightable. 37 C.F.R. § 202.1 (1994).
56. Acuff-Rose, 754 F. Supp. at 1152.
57. Id.
58. Id. This note will not discuss the interference issues.
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B. District Court's Analysis
The United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee, Nashville
Division, addressed the threshold question of whether parodies fall under the
exemption of fair use in section 107 of the Act." The district court recognized that
courts have included parody under the fair use doctrine.' The court stated,
"Including parody within the fair use doctrine has been recognized as 'a means of
fostering the creativity protected by the copyright law.
'
-61
The district court applied the four factors listed in section 107 to determine
whether 2 Live Crew's version of "Oh, Pretty Woman" was a parody, thereby
deserving protection under the fair use exemption to copyright.' Under the first
factor, the purpose and character of the use, the district court found simply that the
purpose of the 2 Live Crew version was to parody the original.' The court
observed that the 2 Live Crew version begins similar to the original but quickly
degenerates into a "play on words, substituting predictable lyrics with shocking
ones."'  The parody borrows the drum beat and bass riff of the original, but the
parody uses a "scraper" effect and off key vocals which result in significant
disparity in style.'
The district court found that the second factor, the nature of the copyrighted
work, weighed against fair use and in favor of Acuff-Rose.' The court followed
the presumption against fair use standard laid down by the United States Supreme
Court in Sony.' The court reasoned that since Acuff-Rose had published "Oh,
Pretty Woman," this indicated that they anticipated some financial gain and the song
had "creative roots."' Because of this anticipated financial gain, the court
presumed that the use was unfair.' Therefore, the second factor weighed against
fair use.7
Under the third factor, the amount of quotation 2 Live Crew used in their parody
did not "run afoul of the substantial factor" test in the court's analysis." The test
59. Id. at 1153.
60. Id. at 1154.
61. Id. (quoting Warner Bros., Inc. v. American Broadcasting Co., 720 F.2d 231, 242 (2d Cir.
1983)).
62. Acuff-Rose, 754 F. Supp. at 1154.
63. Id.
64. The district court observed that the laughter heard on the parody is later explained in the song
when the ensuing choruses depict "a big, hairy woman, a bald-headed woman, and a 'two-timin" woman."
Id. at 1155.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 1155-56.
67. Id.
68. The court used a test stated in MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, 677 F.2d 180, 182 (2d Cir. 1981), which
stated that "the court may consider, among other things, whether the work was creative, imaginative, and
original .... and whether it represented a substantial investment of time and labor made in anticipation
of financial return." Acuff-Rose, 754 F. Supp. at 1154.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 1157.
1995)
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to which the court referred was developed in Berlin v. E.C. Publications, Inc.' In
Berlin, the -owners of songs composed by Irving Berlin sued Mad Magazine for
publishing parodies of the lyrics to those songs." The Second Circuit's oft-quoted
test from Berlin states that, where "the parodist does not appropriate a greater
amount of the original work than is necessary to 'recall or conjure up' the object of
his satire, a finding of infringement would be improper."' The Campbell court
considered the fact that since the medium involved was a song, its purpose was
parody?5 Because the copying was relatively brief, the Court found that 2 Live
Crew did not appropriate more of the original than was necessary. 6
The district court found that the fourth factor, the effect on the market, weighed
in favor of 2 Live Crew." The court stated that it was extremely unlikely that 2
Live Crew's song could adversely affect the market of the original because the two
songs were aimed at different markets."
The district court concluded that the factors under section 107 weighed in 2 Live
Crew's favor.' The district court stated, "Acuff-Rose may not like it, and 2 Live
Crew may not have created the best parody of the original,' but, nonetheless, the
facts convincingly Cemonstrate that it is a parody.""1 Based on this holding, the
court found that 2 Live Crew's version of the song was exempted from infringement
under the fair use exception.' The court granted 2 Live Crew summary judg-
ment.'
C. The Sixth Circuit Court's Analysis
1. The Majority Opinion
The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court's holding.' Judge Joiner, writing for
the majority, considered each of the factors in section 107 in determining that the
derivative work was not fair use." He viewed it as important to focus on what he
72. 329 F.2d 541 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 822 (1964).
73. Id. at 542.
74. Id. at 545.
75. Acuff-Rose, 754 F. Supp. at 1157.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 1158.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Courts will generally not inquire into the quality of a copyrighted work. Even if a work contains
pornographic references, this does not necessarily preclude a finding of fair use. See Pillsbury Co. v.
Milky Way Prods., Inc., 215 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 124, 131 (N.D. Ga. 1981). In Pillsbury Co., the defendant
publication was sued for infringement for indecently portraying plaintiffs' characters "Poppin' Fresh" and
"Poppie Fresh" in various. sexual activities, including an act which is a crime against nature. Acuff-Rose,
754 F. Supp. at 1155.
81. ld.
82. Id. at 1159.
83. Id. at 1160.
84. Acuff-Rose Muic, Inc. v. Campbell, 972 F.2d 1429, 1439 (6th Cir. 1992), cert. granted, 113
S. Ct. 1642 (1993).
85. Id. at 1434.
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called the "plain language" of the statute to make this determination.' He found
that parody is not subsumed under the statutory terms "criticism" or "comment"
listed in the preamble to section 107 of the ActY As the district court had done,
he found that the court must apply the four factors under section 107 of the Act to
determine if the parody was fair use."8
Under the first factor of section 107, the nature of the copyrighted work, the
Sixth Circuit considered whether the copyrighted work represented a substantial
investment of time and labor made in anticipation of financial return. 9 The parties
did not contest the fact that "Oh, Pretty Woman" was a creative work." Thus, the
original work deserved the copyright protection.9' Therefore, the court held that the
first factor favored Acuff-Rose.92
Under the second factor of section 107, the purpose and character of the use,
Judge Joiner found that no parody existed because 2 Live Crew's song did not
directly comment on the original. He stated that the derivative, 2 Live Crew's
version of the original song, was not "at least in part an object of the parody"'93 In
the most important part of the decision, the court held that every commercial use
of copyrighted material is presumptively unfair exploitation and, thus, not fair
use.' The Sixth Circuit placed a great deal of emphasis on this factor in determin-
ing whether the use of the song was fair. 5
The Sixth Circuit agreed with the district court in that the second factor weighed
in favor of Acuff-Rose. 6 The Sixth Circuit observed that "As a general rule -
literary works of fiction or artistic works - are afforded greater protection from the
fair use determination than are works of fact."' The appellate court, much as the
district court did, gave deference to the original artist and found that this factor
favored the original work.9"
For the third factor, the Sixth Circuit looked to the "conjure up" test first
outlined in Berlin"° and later employed in Walt Disney Productions v. Air
Pirates."' In Air Pirates, the Ninth Circuit applied the conjure up test to determine
if the defendants' use of some famous Disney cartoon characters, such as Mickey
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 1435.
89. Id. at 1437.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 1436 (quoting Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301,310 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 365
(1992) (citing MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, 677 F.2d 180, 185 (2d Cir. 1981)).
94. Id. at 1437.
95. See id. at 1435-37.
96. Id. at 1437.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. 329 F.2d 541, 545 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 822 (1964).
101. 581 F.2d 751, 757-59 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1132 (1979).
1995]
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Mouse, was fair as a parody." The defendants' use of the characters in its comic
book depicted the characters as promiscuous drug users, which was somewhat
antithetical to the image of innocent wholesomeness projected by the originals."W
The Ninth Circuit held that because of the widespread recognition of the famous
Disney characters, very little of the original conceptual and physical characteristics
of the characters need be portrayed to place their images in the minds of the
reader." Thus, the defendants went too far in their copying of the original, well
beyond the threshold necessary to conjure up an image of the original characters.'
The Sixth Circuit took an approach different from that used by the district court
in applying the conjure up test utilized in Air Pirates." The Sixth Circuit saw this
issue as one of law based primarily on Fisher v. Dees," as opposed to the fact
driven inquiry employed by the district court." In Fisher, disk jockey Rick Dees
created a parody of a Johnny Mathis song called "When Sonny Gets Blue.""
Dees called his song "When Sonny Sniffs Glue."" ° Dees raised a fair use defense
against the plaintiffs infringement suit for the use of the Mathis song."' The
Ninth Circuit in Fisher considered arguments regarding the amount of copying, as
advanced by the plaintiffs and the defendant's experts, and found that both were
irrelevant."' The plaintiff argued that the original could have been conjured up
using only five notes of the original song. The defendant responded that "we took
the smallest amount possible from 'When Sunny Gets Blue."' The Ninth Circuit
found that "[a]lthough the actual amount taken is a factual issue susceptible of
proof, it is a question of law whether the taking is excessive under the circumstanc-
es."". The Sixth Circuit considered the 2'Live Crew version an excessive taking as
a matter of law because of what they called a "[n]ear verbatim taking of a music
and meter of the copyrighted work."".
The Sixth Circuit observed that other courts have considered the fourth factor, the
effect on the potential market, as "undoubtedly the single most important element
of fair use."".5 The court construed this factor in favor of Acuff-Rose because, as
the Supreme Court observed in Sony,"' a plaintiff need not show actual present
102. Id.
103. Id. at 753.
104. Id. at 757.
105. Id.
106. 581 F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1132 (1979).
107. 794 F.2d 432 (9th Cir. 1986).
108. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. v. Campbell, 972 F.2d 1429, 1437-38 (6th Cir. 1992), cert. granted,
113 S. Ct. 1642 (1993).
109. Fisher, 794 F.2d at 434.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 438 n.4.
113. Id.
114. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. v. Campbell, 972 F.2d 1429, 1438 (6th Cir. 1992), cert. granted, 113
S. Ct. 1642 (1993).
115. Id. (quoting Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 566 (1985)).
116. 464 U.S. 417, 451 (1984).
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harm."7 The plaintiff need only show that a "meaningful likelihood of future harm
exists.....
The Sixth Circuit applied the presumptively unfair standard that the Supreme
Court had set out in Sony."9 Although Judge Joiner stated that this standard was
not dispositive as to the issue of fair use," he did give this factor a good deal of
weight in deciding that issue. Despite his qualification of nondispositiveness, Judge
Joiner put near sole emphasis on this factor as the test for fair use.'
The Sixth Circuit ruled in favor of Acuff-Rose and reversed and remanded the
case.' " The court stated that most of the factors under section 107 weighed in
favor of the plaintiff."z The court seemed to regard the last factor as decisive on
the issue of fair use finding, "It is the blatantly commercial purpose of the
derivative work that prevents this parody from being a fair use."" 4
2. The Dissenting Opinion
Judge Nelson, writing the dissenting opinion, found that the 2 Live Crew version
was fair use."z He recognized the difficulties that fair use cases give courts,
stating that "[t]he parody cases appear to be in hopeless conflict""6 and calling the
fair use issue "the most troublesome in the whole law of copyright.'
1
2
7
Judge Nelson saw the 2 Live Crew version as a readily recognizable parody of
the original." He wrote, in a somewhat pointed manner, that the parody was
"readily recognizable"' 9 because it "clearly intended to ridicule the white-bread
original."''
Judge Nelson applied a public policy consideration that the world is better off
when the law allows parodists to practice their art.' Social criticism is essential
for our society and parody is a potent medium for such essential commentary.
Judge Nelson saw the presumption of unfairness in cases of commercial
exploitation as unnecessary.' He seemed convinced that courts could reasonably
differentiate between outright infringement and derivative works created for social
117. Acuff-Rose, 972 F.2d at 1438.
118. Id. (quoting Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 451 (1984)).
119. 464 U.S. 417, 451 (1984).
120. Acuff-Rose, 972 F.2d at 1437.
121. See id.
122. Id. at 1439.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. (Nelson, J., dissenting).
126. Id.
127. Id. (quoting Dellar v. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 104 F.2d 661, 662 (2d Cir. 1939)).
128. Id. at 1441.
129. Id. at 1442.
130. Id. at 1443.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
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comment or criticism. He saw an "obvious" difference between copying and what
he called "caricaturizing. '1
Judge Nelson suggested that the courts must look to the "ultimate aim" of
copyright law, which is to "stimulate artistic creativity for the general public
good."'35 This aim is best served when courts do not presumptively assume unfair
use when the artist creates a parody for commercial purposes.'36
IV. The Supreme Court's Application of the Fair Use Doctrine in Acuff-Rose
Music, Inc. v. Campbell
A. Analysis Overview
The Supreme Court took up the long awaited task of determining whether parody
deserved an exception to copyright as fair use.'37 Courts had struggled with the
question of how to apply the four factors listed in section 107 of the Act.' Some
courts were misapplying the factors following the Sony decision.'39 Courts were
placing near dispositive emphasis on the fourth factor - if artists used their parody
for financial gain, the courts would presumptively assume that the use was
unfair."4 The Supreme Court applied each of the four factors one at a time to the
2 Live Crew song, giving equal weight to each factor. 4'
Justice Souter, writing for the majority, took a sensible approach to the parody
as fair use question. He observed that the application of the fair use doctrine
requires a case-by-case analysis, as opposed to "bright-line rules."'42 Such an
approach is necessary because section 107 does not define every type of creative
work that a court may exempt under the fair use doctrine. Section 107 provides
only a partial list of the possible candidates for fair use protection.'43 Justice
134. Id.
135. Id. (quoting Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975)).
136. Id.
137. See Nels Jacobson, Note, Faith, Hope & Parody: Campbell v. A cuff-Rose, 'Oh, Pretty Woman,'
and Parodists' Rights, 31 bOus. L. REv. 955, 1014-24 (1994); Patry & Perlmutter, supra note 43, at 667-
89; Joseph E. Sullivan, Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., and the Economic Approach to Parody: An
Appeal to the Supreme Court, I I U. MIAMI ENT. & SPORTS L. REv. 105, 135-37 (1993); Beth Warnken
Van Hecke, Note, But Seriously, Folks: Toward a Coherent Standard of Parody as Fair Use, 77 MINN.
L. REV. 465, 489-94 (1992).
138. See generally Jtcobson, supra note 137; Patry & Perlmutter, supra note 43; Sullivan, supra
note 137; Van Hecke, supra note 137.
139. See generally Pamela Samuelson, Fair Use for Computer Programs and Other Copyrightable
Works in Digital Form: The Implications of Sony, Galoob and Sega, 1 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 49 (1993);
Douglas Reid Weimer, Digital Audio Recording Technology: Challenges to American Copyright Law,
22 ST. MARY'S L.J. 455 (1990); J. Wesley Cochran, Why Can't I Watch This Video Here? Copyright
Confusion and Performance of Videocassettes & Videodiscs in Libraries, 15 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT.
L.J. 837 (1993); David H. Kramer, Note, Who Can Use Yesterday's News?: Video Monitoring and the
Fair Use Doctrine, 81 GEO. L.J. 2345 (1993).
140. See generally id.
141. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 1164, 1170-78 (1994).
142. Id. at 1170.
143. Id.
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Souter observed quite rightly that a "bright-line rule" would be of little help in
deciding what works are exemptible under fair use that are not mentioned in the
preamble of section 107.'"
Avoiding a bright-line test is a sensible approach because works that may
potentially fall within the purview of fair use vary widely in their nature and subject
matter. A case-by-case approach would allow the courts to consider each alleged
infringement, as compared to the copyrighted work, with regard to the particular
nature and subject matter of those works. Even works that fall into one of the
categories listed in the preamble to section 107 may still infringe the original if the
creator of the derivative work went too far in borrowing from the original.'45
Conversely, a work not listed in the preamble may be fair use based on the court's
determination after application of the four factors with regard to the nature and
subject matter of the works.
Thus, a case-by-case application of the four factors listed in section 107 applied
in a uniform way is necessary for all types of derivative works, including parodies.
Additionally, this case-by-case approach would serve to uphold the goals of
copyright, which are' to promote science and the arts'47 through the dissemina-
tion of information. By considering how each case performs under the four factors
outlined in section 107, a court may further this goal of dissemination of informa-
tion by allowing works that do not go too far in their borrowing to reach the public.
Further, a case-by-case application of these factors considers the interests of the
copyright owner as well. If the derivative use does go too far in the borrowing, as
measured by the four factors, the interests of the copyright owner will outweigh the
goal of dissemination, and the court will refuse to allow the release of the derivative
work to the public. Because these competing interests are often very close in
relative weight, a broad and general test would, in many cases, unfairly disadvan-
tage one of the parties involved. Thus, as Justice Souter suggests, courts should
closely consider the interests of each party in a case-by-case approach.4
The Supreme Court issued a caveat that any one of the four factors in section 107
is not necessarily dispositive on the question of fair use, even where one of them
is particularly strong for or against. The Court stated that each of these factors must
144. Id.
145. See Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985) (holding the use of the
plaintiffs information was unfair use, and that although it may fall within the newsreporting exception,
the defendant took the heart of the work); see also Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751,758-
59 (9th Cir. 1978) (holding that excessive copying resulted when defendant copied too exactly the
plaintiffs original work).
146. Justice Souter employed Justice Story's reasoning that some copying is necessary.
In truth, in literature, in science and in art, there are, and can be, few, if any, things,
which in an abstract sense, are strictly new and original throughout. Every book in
literature, science and art, borrows, and must necessarily borrow, and use much which was
well known and used before.
Campbell, 114 S. Ct. at 1169 (quoting Emerson v. Davies, 8 F. Cas. 615, 619 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845)).
147. See U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
148. Campbell, 114 S. Ct. at 1170.
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be considered together and not in isolation.49 Thus, although one factor may
contravene a finding of fair use, the other factors, considered in light of the purpose
of copyright, may rescue that work from a finding of infringement."0
B. Application of Section 107
1. Purpose and Character of Use
Before the Court applied the first factor under section 107, the purpose and
character of the derivaive work's use, the Court addressed a threshold question of
whether the derivative work merely supersedes the original or is somehow
transformative. The Court defined "transformative" as "add[ing] something new,
with a further purpose or different character, altering the first with new expression,
meaning, or message.""
The Court suggested a consideration of the relative degree of the transformation,
in relation to the other factors, was necessary to determine the issue of fair use.'
The test for fair use, under this factor, was based on the degree of the transforma-
tion. The more transformative the new work, the less will be the significance of the
other factors.' The Court found that parody has a transformative value and
therefore parody may claim fair use under section 107.2"5
The Court's decision did not extend fair use to every type of transformative
work." The Court refused to extend the same generous allowances of exception
to copyright to satire as it did to parody." The Court reaffirmed the contention
that if an artist uses a copyrighted work to lampoon some target other than the
original work and points no criticism at the original, the artist is infringing the
original. It reasoned that, "[i]f... the commentary has no critical bearing on the
substance or style of the original composition ... the claim to fairness diminishes
accordiigly (if it does not vanish), and other factors, like the extent of its
commerciality, loom larger.'1
58
Acuff-Rose employed a clever, but ineffective, argument that 2 Live Crew
proceeded in bad faith when they used Acuff-Rose's song after being denied
permission to do so. Acuff-Rose suggested that this bad faith act was not deserving
of an exception to copyright.59 The Court suggested that the state of mind of the
alleged infringer is not central in determining fair use."W The Court, in effect,
149. Id at 1170-71.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 1171.
152. Id
153. d
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. d at 1172.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. d at 1174 n.18.
160. The Court sugges-ted the comparison of Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S.
539, 562 (1985) (stating that fair use presupposes good faith and fair dealing) with Folsom v. Marsh, 9
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turned the bad faith argument in favor of 2 Live Crew. The fact that 2 Live Crew
sought permission before using the song may indicate good faith on their part."'
The Court stated that "[i]f the use is otherwise fair, then no permission need be
sought or granted."'"
2. Nature of the Copyright
An analysis of a derivative work under the second factor in section 107 of the
Act, the nature of the copyrighted work, considers such factors as whether a work
is published or unpublished." Unpublished works generally favor a finding of fair
use because the published work involves an owner's exercising of one of his or her
rights guaranteed under section 106.'6 A copyright owner therefore deserves more
protection for a work that he or she has disseminated to the public."
The second factor under section 107 also considers whether the work is factual
or fictional." Factual works generally favor a finding of fair use because the
works often involve uncopyrightable fact information. 7 Parodists are free to use
factual information in their creations even though their source of that information
is a copyrighted work." The owner may still protect, through copyright, their
choice of method or format of expressing the facts. Anyone may freely use these
facts as long as they do not disseminate them to the public in precisely the same
way that the copyright owner has chosen."
However, a consideration of whether the copyrighted work is published will not
assist a court in making their determination of fair use in parody cases. The second
factor offers little insight as to the fairness of the use of the original work because
parody, by its very nature, must borrow from a known work. The Court, in
Campbell, recognized that the second factor will almost always favor the copyright
owner and weigh against a finding of fair use because, "parodies almost invariably
copy publicly known, expressive works." ' Because of this, the second factor did
not help the Court in determining fair use."'
3. Amount and Substantiality of Portion Used
The third factor under the section 107 test considers the reasonability of the
amount and substantiality used in the derivative work in relation to the purpose of
F. Cas. 342, 349 (No. 4,901) (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (stating that good faith does not bar a finding of
infringement). See also Leval, supra note 43, at 1126-27 (arguing that good faith is irrelevant to fair uses
analysis).
161. Campbell, 114 S. Ct. at 1174.
162. Id. at 1174 n.18.
163. See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 564.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 562-64.
167. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 9, at 597-600.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Campbell, 114 S. Ct. at 1175.
171. Id.
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the copying. In Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation Enterprises," the Supreme
Court saw this factor as a consideration of whether the alleged infringer took the
"heart" of the copyrighted work to use in the derivative work.'" In Harper &
Row, a book publisher sued a magazine which printed a portion of the publisher's
pending release of former president Gerald Ford's memoirs." The Court held that
the use of the infonation was infringement even though the information was
newsworthy and would otherwise fall under the newsreporting exception.'"1
Newsreporting is a fiir use exception listed in the preamble of section 107 of the
Act.1' The Court reasoned that the use was not justified as fair use because the
defendant went beyond mere news reporting and took the most important part of the
original work.'"
The Campbell Court agreed with the court of appeals' evaluation of the case
which considered both the quantity and the quality of the taking. The Supreme
Court considered quality as well as quantity to be relevant questions. This was
because a defendant might borrow only a small portion of the plaintiffs copyrighted
work, yet that small portion may contain the most significant, useful, or interesting
portion of the original. Taking the "heart of the original" would not be fair use
because it would rob the plaintiff of the benefits conveyed under copyright.'78
The Supreme Court also agreed with the Sixth Circuit's consideration of how
much of the original work was copied verbatim." Justice Souter found this type
of evaluation relevant in terms of his transforming/superseding analysis, He said the
evaluation was relevant "for it may reveal a dearth of transformative character or
purpose under the first factor, or a greater likelihood of market harm under the
fourth.""Iw He concluded that a work that takes the heart of the original and that
adds or changes little of the original is more likely "to be a merely superseding use,
fulfilling demand for the original."''
1
The Court did not agree with the court of appeals' conclusion that, under the
"conjure up" test, the amount of 2 Live Crew's use of the Acuff-Rose's song was
excessive." Under the conjure up test, a derivative work is not infringement if
the parodist took only enough of the original to make the object of the comment or
172. 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
173. Id.
174. Id. at 564-66.
175. Id. at 561.
176. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C.A. § 107 (West 1977).
177. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 561.
178. The Supreme Court cited as an example of one such important benefit, the right of first
publication. This was an important benefit which the court had considered in deciding Harper & Row,
Publishers v. Nation Enterprises, because the plaintiff had sought to serialize the original work out to
a news magazine. When the defendant published albeit a small portion of the original work before the
plaintiff was able to begin the serialization, the defendant effectively "scooped" the release of the most
newsworthy part of the original work. See id. at 564.
179. Campbell, 114 S. Ct. at 1175-76.
180. Id. at 1176.
181. Id.
182. Id.
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criticism recognizable.'" The Supreme Court held that 2 Live Crew took the heart
of the original version of the song; however, this was necessary under parody to
conjure up the original in the mind of the listener.'"4
The group took the opening line of the lyrics of the original and the opening bass
riff. Thereafter, the parody departs from the original using different lyrics, keys,
sounds, and drum beat."rs Because the parody was not a verbatim copying and
took only what was necessary of the original, the Court found that the third factor
could not be resolved against the parodist.'"
4. Effect of the Use on the Potential Market
Under the fourth factor of section 107, courts must consider, "the effect of the
use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work." This factor
requires courts to consider how severe the present and future harm the derivative
work will cause the original. In addition, the courts must consider any adverse
effect the derivative would have on the market if the copyright owner chose to
create and sell his or her own derivative of the original.' n
The Court pointed out an obvious problem that defendants in infringement cases
will experience in raising fair use as a defense.'" Defendants carry the burden of
proof to show evidence that their derivative will not harm the market of the
original." 9 At trial, 2 Live Crew produced affidavits on the question of market
harm to the original. However, the Court of Appeals read Sony as presuming unfair
use when a derivative work is used for commercial purposes and found that the
fourth factor weighed against fair use."m
The Supreme Court found that this presumption was error. The Court distin-
guished the rule under Sony because that case involved a verbatim copying of the
original work. In cases where the artist does something more than merely copy the
original, no presumption of unfair use is appropriate.
1 91
The Court suggested that in cases where the derivative work is transformative,
such as parody, courts may not presume market harm and award this factor to the
plaintiff. The Court stated that the parody and the original usually serve different
markets, and, therefore, market substitution is unlikely in most cases."
Acuff-Rose could choose to create and market a nonparody rap version of "Oh,
Pretty Woman." However unlikely this may be, as owners of the copyright, they
183. See Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 438-39 (9th Cir. 1986); Elsmere Music, Inc. v. National
Broadcasting Co., 482 F. Supp. 741, 746 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), affld, 623 F.2d 252, 253 n.1 (2d Cir. 1980).
184. Campbell, 114 S. Ct. at 1176.
185. id.
186. IL
187. See Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 568 (1985).
188. Campbell, 114 S. Ct. at I 177.
189. Id.
190. See Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. v. Campbell, 972 F.2d 1429, 1438 (6th Cir. 1992), cert. granted,
113 S. Ct. 1642 (1993).
191. Campbell, 114 S. Ct. at 1177.
192. Id.
19951
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1995
OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW
may create and market a derivative work of the original whenever they wish to do
so.1" At trial, neither 2 Live Crew nor Acuff-Rose brought forth any evidence of
market harm to a potential nonparody rap version of the original. The Court stated
that this evidentiary gap would likely be filled on remand to the trial court.' The
Court ruled that the, would not presume unfair use because of the mere potential
of harm to the market a derivative of the original created by the copyright owner
might suffer. Such a presumption of unfair use would be inappropriate and the trial
court should consider evidence supporting or discounting market harm to a
derivative created by Acuff-Rose"
C. The Concurring Opinion
Justice Kennedy, writing the concurring opinion, emphasized the requirement that
if parody is to enjoy a fair use exception, it must focus its criticism or comment on
the original work. IHe wrote, "The parody must target the original, and not just its
general style, the genre of art to which it belongs, or society as a whole .... "
Justice Kennedy stated that the parody must target the original work to satisfy the
four factors in section 107. He stated that the first factor defines parody. The
second factor adds little, because parodies by their very nature copy the original
work. The third factor, he argued, prohibits "profiteers" who do little more than add
a few silly words to the original work. Finally, the fourth factor allows independent
creative works to compete with one another in the same market."
Justice Kennedy thus made it very clear that fair use can never apply to satire
because satire does not focus its criticism upon the original. He stated that the
definition of parody must be kept within its proper limits or musicians could
"exploit existing works and then later claim that their rendition was a valuable
commentary on the original."'99 He observed that "[j]ust the thought of a rap
version of Beethoven's Fifth Symphony or 'Achy Breaky Heart' is bound to make
people smile," but he apparently believed that the potential for abuse of the fair use
exception was high. Without the strict limitation on parody as fair use, the
majority's decision would weaken the protection of fair use."
V. The Problem with Parody - A New Approach
A. The Future Implication of Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.
Courts that hear parody cases must make a threshold determination as to whether
the derivative work is in fact a parody. They must consider what comment or
criticism the derivative work purports to make. The art of parody demands that the
193. The right to create derivative works of the copyrighted original is one of the rights guaranteed
under § 106 of the Act.
194. Campbell, 114 S. Ct. at 1179.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 1180 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
197. Id.
198. Id. at 1181.
199. Id.
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courts look to the nature of the work and exercise their artistic expertise to
determine whether a true parody is present or merely a trifling knockoff.
The Supreme Court's decision in Campbell effectively charges courts with the
dual duty of determining the artistic merit of a derivative work and its potential -
market success. The Court stated, "the role of the courts is to distinguish between
'[b]iting criticism [that merely] suppresses demand, [and] copyright infringement
[which] usurps it."'"' This duty is quite difficult on both fronts.
The parody may involve some esoteric artistic critique of the original that,
although readily apparent to those learned in that particular medium, is lost upon
the court. Courts must guess, therefore, at the likely sophistication of the public and
determine if the parody will perform as a market substitute for the original.
Justice Souter recognized that courts may not have the appropriate adeptness to
determine the quality of a parody, whether it be in good taste or bad. Other
Supreme Court justices had questioned a court's competence to consider such issues.
Justice Souter cited Justice Holmes' comments in Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithograph-
ing Co. :201
It would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the law
to constitute themselves final judges of the worth of [a work], outside
of the narrowest and most obvious limits. Their very novelty would
make them repulsive until the public had learned the new language in
which their author spoke.'
The Act guarantees the copyright owners the sole right to profit from their
creation. Copyright bars the infringer from obtaining commercial gain from the
original author's cleverness and creativity. Parody would, however, allow an artist
to gain commercially from ideas contained in the original. Courts must guess at the
commercial success a parody might enjoy to determine the potential likelihood of
market substitution. This is a nearly impossible burden because it requires the
courts to do what recording industry experts fail at regularly: determining how well
a record will sell before its release.
It is possible, and even likely, that the parody will appeal to a different audience
than the original work. For example, a rap song of the 1990s is likely to appeal to
a different buyer than a pop song of the early 1960s. Here, market substitution is
a moot issue because, even if the parody is wildly successful, it will not necessarily
reduce sales of the original. 3 Courts may find help in making such a determina-
tion (as well as the artistic merit and marketability of a song) from the parties in the
infringement case. Fair use is an affirmative defense, and the defendant has the
200. Id. at 1178 (quoting Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 438 (9th cir. 1986)).
201. 188 U.S. 239 (1903).
202. Campbell, 114 S. Ct. at 1173 (quoting Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 251 (Holmes, J.) (noting that
circus posters have copyright protection)).
203. The Court rejected any notion that a defendant in an infringement case could make use of the
argument that the infringing use actually helped the original to become a commercial success. Id. at 1177
n.21.
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burden of proof to show that no market substitution will occur.' It is incumbent
upon the parties to educate the court on the nature of the particular genre involved
in the case.
B. Serving the Goals of Copyright - Broadening the Scope To Include Satire
Courts consider sociopolitical commentary an important enough purpose to nullify
the original artist's rights guaranteed under copyright. Assuming this as a premise
for fair use, it should make little difference whether the copyrighted work or some
other object is the victim of the commentary. Justice Kennedy, writing the
concurring opinion, was particularly critical of applying fair use to satire. If fair use
is to protect an artist's right to point out some social flaw or make a humorous
comment on society, it should do so even if the artist achieves his or purpose by
merely using the copyrighted work as vehicle.
The Supreme Court in Campbell seemed indifferent to the policy behind fair use
that social criticism is necessary and important when addressing satire as an
exclusion to copyright. In satire, a derivative work may take aim at some target
other than the original work itself to express a comment or criticism of some aspect
of our world. For example, an artist may use the music of a copyrighted song, but
add lyrics that point to the faults of some political figure.
This type of expression would not fall precisely under the auspices of parody and,
hence, the protection of fair use.' However, the Court should have applied the
same rationale to satire, which compelled it to find that parody is a necessary and
useful artform. Justice, Souter argued that satire is not fair use where "the alleged
infringer merely uses [the original work] to get attention or to avoid the drudgery
in working up something fresh.'
The purpose of parody is to raise social consciousness on some political or social
folly, naivet6, banality, etc. The artist does this by drawing attention to an example
of folly, naivet6, banality, etc., by poking fun at the subject matter contained in a
copyrighted work. On the other hand, an example of some social or political
iniquity may exist el;ewhere in society which the artist may wish to address by
using a copyrighted work to assist him or her in the task. In both parody and satire,
the artist uses a copyrighted work to raise social awareness.
Justice Kennedy, in his concurring opinion, failed to explain why it is acceptable
for an artist to use e. copyrighted work in one fashion (parody) to raise social
consciousness and it is unacceptable to use a copyrighted work in another fashion
(satire) to achieve the same raising of consciousness. In each instance, the goal is
the same. It is the methods of achieving the goal that are different.
Justice Kennedy seems to hint that his objection is that the satirist uses the
copyrighted work to achieve financial gain by drawing attention to himself. Yet,
204. Id. at 1177.
205. Justice Kennedy, writing the concurring opinion, argued that "parody may qualify as fair use
only if it draws upon the original composition to make humorous or ironic commentary about that same
composition." Id. at 1180 (emphasis added).
206. I. at 1172.
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this reasoning fails under the weight of the majority's opinion which held that a
work borrowing from a copyrighted work is not presumptively unfair even if the
second work was created for financial gain.
Justice Kennedy looks to the fourth factor of section 107 as a test to consider
what he calls the "substitutive effect" of the parody.' He seems to distinguish a
parody from a satire by observing that a parody "by definition" is a "creative
work."'8 His argument fails because under his definition both parodies and satires
are creative works. Both borrow a portion of the original copyright work which the
artist uses in poking fun at some target. Both ultimately create something that is
different from the original. Both must contain some significant amount of new
creativity; otherwise, they will fail as fair use under the other three factors of
section 107. Thus, both are creative works.
Justice Kennedy recognizes that courts will struggle in applying the fourth factor
because the courts must determine if the new derivative work serves as a substitute
in the market for the original copyrighted work.' He believes that this struggle
may be avoided by refusing to recognize a fair use exception for works that do not
direct their criticism in some way to the copyrighted work from which the artist
borrowed. Justice Kennedy's argument presupposes that a satire would somehow
pose a greater danger of market substitution than a parody. Yet, both the majori-
ty2 and Justice Kennedy. observed that the new work may compete against
and even damage the market of the original. However, the parody/satire cannot
replace the original in the same market as is prohibited in the fourth factor of
section 107.
Therefore, under Justice Kennedy's analysis, a pure satire (one which focuses
solely on a subject other than the copyrighted work in question) does not deserve
a fair use exception. This is an example of the kind of "bright-line" rule that Justice
Souter argued against in the majority opinion. Under Justice Souter's approach,
courts must consider all of the factors under section 107 in analyzing a fair use
defense and not summarily reject a fair use consideration merely because the work
does not focus solely on the original work.
C. Addressing the Potential Misuses of Fair Use in Parody Cases
Justice Kennedy, as well as other courts, have been concerned with the notion
that, if strict limitations were not placed on parody as fair use, the ostensible
parodist could plunder with impunity the creative cache of others.2 2 This is
because crafty composers might simply label their works a "parody" when, in
reality, they are shamelessly pilfering from the original to make a few bucks."3
207. Id. at 1181.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Justice Souter, in the majority opinion, stated, "We do not, of course, suggest that a parody
may not harm the market at all, but when a lethal parody, like a scathing theater review, kills demand
for the original, it does not produce a harm cognizable under the Copyright Act." Id. at 1178.
211. Id. at 1181.
212. Id.
213. Courts have found that a parody which would normally be excepted from infringement under
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The parody exception, therefore, demands that a derivative work have some other
meaningful purpose other than merely a pursuit of commercial gain by taking a free
ride on another's creativity.
Justice Souter handled this issue through his transforming/superseding analysis.
Justice Souter concluded that a parody was not fair use if it "superseded" the
original. That is, a parody is not fair use if it replaces the original in the market."'
Yet this analysis, in part, is merely a consideration of the financial effect that a
parody would have on the market of the original. Thus, this analysis puts emphasis
on the first and fourth factors of section 107 of the Act.
Courts must weigh each of the four factors under section 107 to determine fair
use. Yet, two of the factors, the first and the fourth, focus on the harm aspect of the
parodist's creation to the market of the original.215 Courts should look closely at
the fourth factor under the section 107 test. This factor deserves particularly close
scrutiny in its application to a fair use defense because it provides the most tangible
measure of harn to the plaintiff in a particular case.
A particular parody/satire may or may not serve as a substitute in the market of
the original copyrighted work. The potential for market substitution varies with
several factors vis-4-vis the original, e.g., the type of subject matter involved, the
amount borrowed from the original, the extent to which the original work and the
parody/satire will compete in the market, etc. In reality, it is unlikely that the
parody/satire and the original will compete for the same buyers.
A buyer who wishes to purchase a copy of a well-known favorite song will not
likely be interested in a modified version of that song which contains some social
or political commentary. The buyer will seek out the unadulterated original. The
converse is true as well; a buyer looking for a good laugh about some social or
political subject will not get the sought after entertainment from the original version.
Under Justice Soater's transforming/superseding analysis, a court must look, at
least in part, a bit further than the four factors listed under section 107 of the Act
while deciding an infringement case. In applying this analysis, courts must also
consider the social, political, and artistic intent of the defendant's work. The
defendant must do more than merely transform the original work. The defendant
must also have in mind some purpose for the derivative work. The alleged
infringers can justify the appropriateness of fair use for their derivative work by
pointing to the target of their social, political, or artistic comment or criticism. If
an artist who created the derivative work did not transform the original for some
legitimate purpose other than mere financial gain, the court will find that artist liable
for infringement. In such instances, it matters very little what label the alleged
infringer gives the derivative work. The alleged infringers may call their derivative
fair use may still infringe if the primary purpose behind a parody is merely an attempt to make money.
See Original Appalachian Artworks v. Topps Chewing Gum, 642 F. Supp. 1031, 1034 (N.D. Ga. 1986).
214. Campbell, 114 S. Ct. at 1172.
215. See Deck, supra note 50, at 59-60 (arguing that courts should focus on the first and fourth
factors of § 107 of the Copyright Act of 1976).
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work a "parody," yet if they are not prepared to prove the parodic intent, their label
means nothing.
VI. Conclusion
The Supreme Court's decision under Campbell provided a long anticipated answer
to the question of where parody fits in the area of copyright law. Parodies will no
longer be assumed an unfair use of the copyrighted original work merely because
the parodist wishes to market the work for financial gain. The parodist, however,
must have some purpose for their work that they can prove to the court and that is
separate from solely a financial one.
Parody may now qualify as fair use if it meets the four requirements under
section 107 as the Court has applied them. Parody which meets the demands of
these four factors will thus serve the primary purpose of copyright - the dissemina-
tion of information. Justice Souter's transforming/superseding test serves to advance
a secondary goal of copyright - to encourage creation of new works. Derivative
works which transform the original, not merely supersede it in the marketplace,
advance this goal. This is true regardless of whether the derivative work is aimed
at the original copyrighted work itself as a parody or whether the derivative is
aimed at some other subject matter as satire. In either case, artists must have some
social or political comment or criticism in mind when using the copyrighted
material. If an artist who creates a derivative work is prepared to meet their burden
of proving that their artistic vision was not merely of dollar signs, then parody/satire
as fair use is fair, and the goals of copyright are served.
L. David McBride
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